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Abstract 43 typically-developed adults and 35 adults
with ASD performed a cartoon faux pas test. Adults with
ASD apparently over-detected faux pas despite good
comprehension abilities, and were generally slower at
responding. Signal detection analysis demonstrated that the
ASD participants had significantly greater difficulty
detecting whether a cartoon depicted a faux pas and
showed a liberal response bias. Test item analysis
demonstrated that the ASD group were not in agreement
with a reference control group (n = 69) about which non-
faux pas items were most difficult. These results suggest
that the participants with ASD had a primary problem with
faux pas detection, but that there is another factor at work,
possibly compensatory, that relates to their choice of a
liberal response criterion.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder  Faux pas  Social
cognition  Decision making  Open-ended  Compensatory
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Introduction
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder involving
impairments in social interaction and communication, and
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests or
activities (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association 2013;
ICD-10, World Health Organization 1992). One common
explanation for the difficulties in social interaction is a
deficit in the ability to mentalize, or Theory of Mind
(ToM), the aptitude for inferring other people’s states of
mind, such as intentions, beliefs, desires and wishes (Frith
and Frith 2006). While older and more high-functioning
individuals on the autism spectrum tend to pass traditional
ToM tasks used with lower-functioning children, they
display persistent daily difficulties understanding other
people’s states of mind (Frith et al. 1994).
In order to reveal these individuals’ persistent ToM
deficits, Baron-Cohen and colleagues developed an
advanced ToM task based on the ability to recognise faux
pas (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999). A faux pas was defined as a
situation where ‘‘a speaker says something without con-
sidering if it is something that the listener might not want
to hear or know, and which typically has negative conse-
quences that the speaker never intended’’ (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1999, p. 408). The recognition of a faux pas is con-
sidered an advanced test of ToM ability as it requires subtle
social reasoning: one must be able to appreciate (a) that
two protagonists might have different knowledge states and
also (b) the emotional impact a statement can have on the
listener (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2010). In this
way, recognition of a faux pas committed by others is
closely related to recognition of embarrassment; the
Oxford Dictionary defines a faux pas as ‘‘an embarrassing
or tactless act or remark in a social situation’’ (Faux pas
[Def. 1] 2015). By definition therefore, all faux pas state-
ments lead to an awkward situation where one or more
character is embarrassed. Indeed, all those involved in a
particular situation who realise a faux pas has occurred
tend to feel embarrassed: the person who committed the
faux pas, the person who was affected by it, and any
witnesses.
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High-functioning children and adults with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) who perform well on first- and
second-order false-belief tasks consistently display diffi-
culties in recognising faux pas situations (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1999; Zalla et al. 2009). In Baron-Cohen’s study, the
group of children with ASD showed a tendency to under-
detect faux pas in comparison to a control group (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1999). Interestingly, adults with medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) lesions also tend to under-detect
faux pas (Stone et al. 1998); this region is both widely
associated with ToM (Frith and Frith 2006) and known to
be abnormally recruited by people with ASD (Gilbert et al.
2008). Surprisingly however, a recent study testing adults
with ASD on an adapted adult version of the same faux
pas task (Stone et al. 1998) found the opposite pattern
(Zalla et al. 2009): adults with ASD tended to over-detect
faux pas, thinking that they had occurred when in fact they
had not.
In this study, we examine four possible explanations for
this apparent ‘‘over-detection’’ of faux pas in adults. The
first possibility (Hypothesis 1) is that a feature of autism
might be excessive attribution of mental states, i.e. to over-
mentalizing. This seems prima facie unlikely since ToM
impairments are widely attributed to a lack of attribution
and understanding of others’ mental states, i.e. to under-
mentalizing (Frith 2004). However, it is a possibility that
should nevertheless be examined in a study of this kind. If
this account were true, then the ASD participants would be
likely, when presented with faux pas test-like formats, to
always detect faux pas when they are present, but also
over-detect, perhaps, when they are not. Moreover, their
performances should be well predicted by the difficulty of
the items in controls—i.e. if typically developing (TD)
adults find a faux pas is easy to detect then they will detect
it easily too, and similarly, if a faux pas is hard to detect,
then they should also find it hard, even if they then may
adopt a liberal criterion for deciding that one is present (i.e.
require less evidence before deciding that a faux pas has
been committed). However, their performance overall
would be expected to be good, and in line with TD adults
who similarly adopt a liberal criterion.
A second, putative account (Hypothesis 2) is that, as a
consequence of poor mentalizing skills, adults with ASD
compensate by becoming over-sensitive to embarrassment;
adults with ASD are certainly capable of experiencing
vicarious social pain (Paulus et al. 2013), although their
affective responses to vicarious embarrassment may be
modulated and reduced by their difficulties in understand-
ing and integrating another person’s mental state. Even
children with ASD seem to have a rather good conceptual
understanding of embarrassment (Capps et al. 1992; Hillier
and Allinson 2002a, b). It is possible therefore that the
combination of poor mentalizing ability plus intact
awareness of embarrassment might lead an individual with
ASD to be over-sensitive to potentially embarrassing sit-
uations (Hypothesis 2a). A strongly related version of this
(Hypothesis 2b) is that, having been told, or having learnt
through experience, that they are poor in such situations,
people with ASD deliberately adopt a strategy of suspect-
ing embarrassment potential when in doubt, but this is not
due to mentalizing difficulties. These accounts both predict
adoption of a liberal criterion for saying that a faux pas has
been committed, but (2a) also predicts poor ability to detect
faux pas when they are present. An account of these ‘‘in-
creased sensitivity’’ types may also predict relatively fast
reaction times (RTs) when faux pas are presented, because
the ASD participants are, in effect, primed to see them.
A third possible explanation (Hypothesis 3) for ‘‘false
positives’’ in adult ASD participants’ faux pas responses
encompasses a variety of hypotheses that can be loosely
grouped together as all involving social cognitive pro-
cesses. One example is that knowing when a faux pas has
not been committed is a harder form of social judgement
than detecting a faux pas when it has been committed. This
may occur for instance if detection of faux pas proceeds
through a trial-and-error process of attempting to fit a set of
experience-based social schemas of ‘‘embarrassing situa-
tions’’ to the stimuli. Where no faux pas is depicted in the
stimulus materials, the fitting or search process will on
average be more extensive (i.e. because it will have to run
until exhaustion) than where a faux pas is shown. If the
problem that people with ASD have with performance of
faux pas tests is because they have a decrement in a ‘‘social
cognition’’ mental resource, and individual variation in this
same resource is also the cause of performance differences
between TD individuals, then the test items that TD adults
find hard (or easy) should also be found relatively hard (or
easy) by people with ASD. In other words, the mean per-
formance or intercept may change, but the relative diffi-
culties (as measured by accuracy) of different test items
should be similar across the two populations. This
hypothesis predicts that RTs should be slower when stimuli
are being shown that contain no faux pas, since the
exhaustive searching and problem-solving that will be
required to decide that there was no faux pas will be
reflected in response times.
A fourth possible explanation (Hypothesis 4) concerns
non-social decision-making processes and makes a very
different prediction. Specific cognitive processes are
recruited when dealing with ‘‘open-ended’’ (or in the jar-
gon of the field ‘‘ill-structured’’) situations that are not also
involved when one is dealing with well-structured prob-
lems (Burgess et al. 2007). Open-ended problems have a
typical set of characteristics, for example, (a) there may be
many ways to achieve a given aim; (b) participants have to
decide for themselves what constitutes success; (c) success
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or failure is not clearly signalled at the time of problem-
solving. It is easy to see how a test item that asks whether a
faux pas has been committed when it does not actually
depict one (a ‘‘non-faux pas item’’) may differ along this
dimension of ‘‘open-endedness’’ compared with an item
that requires detection of a faux pas when one is depicted.
For instance, when one has detected a faux pas, one can be
fairly sure of the correctness of one’s response. However,
when one responds that no faux pas is depicted, there will
always be the possibility that one exists but it was not
detected (and therefore that one should have carried on
looking). The participant has to set the criteria for their
decision point themselves, which is one of the character-
istics of ‘‘open-endedness’’. People with a diagnosis of
ASD tend to be poorer at open-ended neuropsychological
tasks compared with well-structured ones (White et al.
2009). So it is plausible that non-faux pas items may be
harder for people with ASD than faux pas ones quite
independently of their social content. This possibility pre-
dicts a specific pattern of results on non-faux pas items by
individuals with ASD: if the problem with these items is
independent of the social content of the items, then item-
by-item variability in performance will not match that of
TD adults who will have no difficulties dealing with open-
ended situations. In this circumstance, most of the variance
in TD data will reflect the difficulty of the social processing
of the items, but the variance in the ASD non-faux pas
items will reflect individual differences in ability to deal
with open-ended situations. Thus item-by-item accuracies
should be similar between different samples of the TD
population, but these values should not be well predictive
of item-by-item accuracies in an ASD population. Fur-
thermore, on the faux pas items (i.e. where a faux pas is
depicted) ASD participants’ item-by-item performance
should be relatively closer to the TD population, since they
should find items that are less ‘‘open-ended’’ but require a
considerable depth of social processing hard in a similar
way to TD populations. This account should also predict
that RTs to the non-faux pas items should be slower in
ASD participants than they are for faux-pas items, since it
is implausible that problems dealing with the open-end-
edness of the non-faux pas items would not have a con-
sequence for processing and decision speed.
These four possibilities were investigated in this study.
We used a newly created version of the faux pas test. In
Zalla et al.’s (2009) study, the examiner sat in front of the
participant and read each story aloud. The story was also
placed in front of the participant so they could read along
themselves and remained there throughout the reading and
questioning. This procedure places a large demand upon
verbal auditory skill and reading comprehension. It also
perhaps places a substantial demand upon imagination and
imagery. We sought to try to reduce these potentially
confounding variables by using a simple cartoon-like pre-
sentation of the social scenarios.
Method
Participants
Forty-three TD adults and thirty-five high-functioning
individuals with a diagnosis on the autism spectrum took
part, all of whom were native English speakers and none of
whom had significant hearing, visual or motor impair-
ments. The UCL Research Ethics Committee approved the
study and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. None of the TD participants had any known
psychiatric or neurological conditions or any ASD diag-
noses amongst their first-degree relatives. All ASD par-
ticipants had previously received a clinical diagnosis of
high-functioning autism (2 participants) or Asperger’s
syndrome (33 participants) from a qualified clinician
according to standard diagnostic criteria. We were unable
to obtain written confirmation of diagnoses for 5 partici-
pants; however they were not excluded as they provided
verbal confirmation of their diagnosis, met the autism
diagnostic observation schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000)
criteria for autism spectrum or autism, and their autism
spectrum quotients (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) were
above the recommended cut-off of 32. ADOS scores were
available for 32 of the 35 ASD participants, 24 meeting
criteria for an ASD. The eight participants whose ADOS
scores fell below the cut-off were not excluded as they
provided a reliable written clinical diagnosis and their AQs
were above 32. Furthermore, exclusion of these partici-
pants from the ASD groups did not change the results from
the cartoon faux pas test. All ASD participants had full-
scale Wechsler intelligence quotients (FSIQ)[80 (WAIS-
III-UK, Wechsler 1998; WASI, Wechlser 1999). In the
ASD group, separate verbal (VIQ) and performance IQ
(PIQ) scores were unavailable for one participant as he was
tested on the two-subtest form of the WASI.
The two groups were comparable in age (U = 762,
p = .924), gender [v2(1) = 1.833, p = .176], VIQ
[t(75) = 1.394, p = .167], PIQ [t(58.5) = .698, p = .488]
and FSIQ [t(76) = .100, p = .920]. However, as expected
the ASD group showed significantly higher AQ scores
(U = 1313, p\ .001; see Table 1).
To perform an item analysis, we gathered a separate
‘‘reference TD’’ sample (N = 69) with a mean age of
30.5 years (SD 10.4) and mean national adult reading test
(NART; Nelson and Willison 1991) IQ equivalent of 115.6
(SD 6.6; this figure is based on N = 68); fifty-four percent
were male. These values are not tightly matched with the
‘‘matched TD’’ group nor the ASD group but this is
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irrelevant for this psychometric analysis since we are
considering only relative differences between test items,
not groups or individuals.
Materials and Procedure
The cartoon faux pas test involved 52 short cartoon stories
and was inspired by Baron-Cohen’s faux pas recognition
test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999; Stone et al. 1998), which
used 10 faux pas and 10 control audio-recorded and
written stories. Here, eighteen cartoons showed faux pas
situations, while eighteen showed non-faux pas social
situations. Seven of the faux pas cartoon stories were
directly adapted from Baron-Cohen et al.’s stories; the
remainder were novel. Participants were required to
decide whether each of these 36 cartoons was embar-
rassing or not; this word was presented below each car-
toon followed by a question mark (i.e.: ‘‘Embarrassing?’’).
This differs from Baron-Cohen et al.’s task where the test
question asked whether someone had said something they
should not have. The participants’ ability to understand
the cartoon stories was investigated by the inclusion of
sixteen additional comprehension stories depicting ordi-
nary social situations. The question appearing below these
cartoons was also a yes/no question that differed from
cartoon to cartoon, and focussed on story comprehension
without an obvious requirement for mentalizing. There
were slightly fewer comprehension items compared to the
social cognition items in order to keep the administration
time of the test to a minimum.
Each cartoon story involved 2 or 3 frames with an
average of 30 words presented in speech bubbles (see
Figs. 1, 2, 3); the exact number of words was matched strip
by strip between the three cartoon types. The cartoons were
simple line drawings, emphasizing the outline of the
character and attempting to avoid distracting details. Each
cartoon character was drawn without any facial expression,
and the cartoons were created using Comic Live software
(http://plasq.com/products/comiclife2/). For the faux pas
cartoons, the embarrassing statement (or faux pas) occurred
either in the first sentence, one of the middle sentences, or
the last sentence on an equal number of occasions. The
non-faux pas stories followed a similar pattern to those
where a faux pas occurred, for example, someone made an
error or broke into a conversation, minor incidents or
quarrels occurred (e.g. children fighting, someone criticis-
ing or being disappointed), or the characters discussed
serious matters (e.g. money or sickness). Every character
used in the faux pas cartoons was also used in the non-faux
pas cartoons.
The task was presented on a laptop using E-Prime
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA,
USA). Participants sat approximately 80 cm from the
screen and were tested in a quiet testing room. Participants
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible but
without making any mistakes; a maximum of 32 s was
allowed for each cartoon. Two of the comprehension car-
toons were used as practice examples, followed by seven
more comprehension cartoons as test items. Participants
then practiced one embarrassing and one non-embarrassing
cartoon, followed by the remaining 34 faux pas and non-
faux pas cartoons. Lastly, seven more comprehension
cartoons were presented. The order of presentation of the
cartoons was randomized and held constant across partic-
ipants. One of the faux pas items was excluded from the
analysis because all but 2 participants answered correctly
to this item so there was no useful variance in the
responses. Hence, 14 comprehension, 16 faux pas and 17
non-faux pas items were included in the analyses.
Data Analysis
The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, the
accuracy performances of the matched ASD and TD groups
were compared to determine if the cartoon faux pas test
reliably demonstrated the previously reported pattern for a
test of this type, i.e. false positive responses in the non-faux
pas condition by the ASD group. Three basic scores were
computed for each participant: a comprehension cartoon
score (percentage of correct answers to the comprehension
cartoons), a faux pas cartoon score (percentage of correct
answers to cartoons containing a faux pas = true-positive
answers to the ‘‘Embarrassing?’’ question) and a non-faux
pas cartoon score (percentage of correct answers to car-
toons where no faux pas was present = true-negative
Table 1 Participant characteristics for matched groups: mean and
(SD)
ASD (n = 35) TD (n = 43)
Age 35.40 (10.59) 35.33 (10.54)
Gender (M:F) 24:11 23:20
VIQa 117.09 (13.83) 113.16 (10.27)
PIQa 109.00 (14.70) 111.07 (10.73)
FSIQ 114.17 (14.54) 113.84 (9.71)
AQb,*** 35.40 (8.83) 17.13 (6.78)
ADOSc 12 Autism –
12 Autism spectrum –
8 None –
ASD Autism spectrum disorder, TD typically developed, VIQ verbal,
PIQ performance, FSIQ Full-scale intelligence quotients
*** p\ .001
a Data unavailable for one ASD participant
b Autism spectrum quotient; data unavailable for five TD participants
c Data unavailable for three ASD participants
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answers to the ‘‘Embarrassing?’’ question). RTs were also
calculated for these three trial types. When comparing the
groups’ performance, non-parametric analyses were used
whenever variables violated the assumptions of normality
and homogeneity.
Second, we conducted a signal detection analysis. Signal
detection theory (SDT) provides a way of investigating
behaviour when a person has to make a decision about
whether a signal is present or not. In this case the signal is
whether a faux pas has been committed. What makes SDT
analysis different from standard threshold theories is that it
is acknowledged that in making such a decision the
participant has not only to be sensitive to a signal, but also
to set a criterion for themselves as to what degree of signal
will be required before they say ‘‘yes’’. Specifically, SDT
analysis provides two statistics. The first is called d0, and
indicates the difficulty of the task for the individual. The
easier the task the larger the proportion of ‘‘hits’’ (i.e. times
when the participant has correctly said ‘‘yes’’ to a faux pas
cartoon) and the smaller the proportion of ‘‘false positives’’
(i.e. times when the participant has said ‘‘yes’’ to a cartoon
that does not depict a faux pas). The second statistic, called
C, reflects the strategy of the participant. A participant who
always says ‘‘no’’ will never commit a false positive. And a
Fig. 1 Example faux pas item
Fig. 2 Example non-faux pas
item
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participant who always says ‘‘yes’’ will attain 100 % hits.
A participant who tends to respond ‘‘yes’’ is called liberal
and a participant who tends to respond ‘‘no’’ is called
conservative. According to SDT, these two different mea-
sures of performance (sensitivity to the signal/detection
ability; criterion-setting strategy) are theoretically inde-
pendent mental components that both contribute to per-
formance (for an overview of SDT and calculation of the
appropriate statistics see Abdi 2007; Stanislaw and
Todorov 1999).
In the third stage of analysis, we employed a psycho-
metric item analysis procedure to analyse responses to
individual items from the reference sample of 69 TD par-
ticipants, and compared these with each of the matched
groups. This allowed us to examine a standard ‘‘task dif-
ficulty’’ explanation for performance differences between
the groups and was assessed by considering item difficulty
plots. For each condition (faux-pas, non-faux pas and
comprehension), the difficulty of each test item was
established by considering the mean accuracy performance
on that item by the N = 69 reference control sample. The
mean percentage of correct responses for each of these
items for the matched TD and ASD groups were then
plotted against this scale. A fitted line that described the
difficulty function was calculated by linear regression.
Results
Between-Group Comparisons
As expected, the ASD and matched TD groups correctly
responded to the vast majority of comprehension control
cartoons (77 %) and there was no difference between the
groups (U = 789, p = .709; see Table 2). This very sim-
ilar performance across the groups for the Comprehension
items was not however repeated for those involving faux
pas detection. Considering the faux pas and non-faux pas
cartoon scores separately, TD participants correctly iden-
tified non-faux pas cartoons as not containing a faux pas
90 % of the time, whereas for ASD participants this figure
was 75 %. This difference was highly significant
(U = 342.5, p\ .001), indicating over-detection of faux
pas in the ASD group. By contrast, on average, TD par-
ticipants identified faux pas cartoons as containing a faux
pas 79 % of the time, while ASD participants did so for
74 % of the cartoons. This difference did not approach
statistical significance (U = 636, p = .236).
Given previous gender effects in ToM research (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1997), it is worth noting that despite slight,
non-significant disparities in gender balance between these
Fig. 3 Example comprehension
item
Table 2 Accuracy and reaction times for the matched groups on the
cartoon faux pas test: means (and SD)
ASD TD
Accuracy (% age)
Comprehension 78 (14) 77 (12)
Faux pas 74 (17) 79 (9)
Non-faux pas 75 (19) 90 (13)
Reaction time (ms)
Comprehension 9995 (4401) 8764 (2336)
Faux pas 11,175 (4464) 9615 (2739)
Non-faux pas 10,647 (4444) 8866 (2640)
ASD Autism spectrum disorder, TD typically developed
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two groups, there was no significant effect of gender on any
of these measures, either across the whole sample, or
within either group (all ps[ .16).
Correlations between accuracy measures were calcu-
lated separately for each group using Spearman’s rank
order correlation coefficient. In the ASD group, none of the
three cartoon types related to each other (rss\ .31). In the
TD group, a significant correlation was only found between
the comprehension score and the faux pas item accuracy
(rs=.409, p = .006).
Each participant’s mean RT was also measured for all
three cartoon types (see Table 2). No significant difference
was observed between the groups on the Comprehension
cartoons [t(49.3) = 1.49, p = .142]. RTs for both groups
were faster for the non-faux pas than the faux pas items
[F(1,76) = 21.68, p\ .001]. Across these two conditions,
the ASD participants took significantly longer than the TD
group to give their responses [F(1,76) = 4.32, p = .041],
but there was no group by condition interaction
[F(1,76) = .653, p = .421]. Unsurprisingly, RTs on the
three cartoon types were significantly and positively cor-
related with each other in both groups (rs[ .9, ps\ .001).
Signal Detection Analysis
Values of d0 and C were calculated according to Brophy
(1986). The matched TD and ASD groups differed signif-
icantly in their d0 values [mean ASD 1.4 (SD .7), TD 2.0
(.5), t = 4.45, p\ .001]. In other words, the ASD group
were very significantly poorer at knowing if a cartoon
depicted a faux pas or not. The values of C were also
significantly different between the groups [TD median .15;
ASD median -.11, W = 1919.5, p = .027 (adjusted for
ties)]. However, a simpler way of considering the C values
is just in terms of whether someone was liberal or con-
servative in their use of ‘‘yes’’ as a response across all faux
pas items. According to this straightforward approach, 9
out of the 43 TD participants (20.9 %) would be classified
as ‘‘liberal’’ in their use of ‘‘yes’’ as a response, whereas 20
out of 35 ASD participants (57.1 %) would be classed as
liberal in use of ‘‘yes’’. This difference is highly significant
[v2(1) = 10.833, p = .001].
Item Analysis
The item difficulty plots in Fig. 4 show that across all
conditions, the test items that the reference group found
most difficult were also those that the TD and ASD groups
found most difficult (all p\ .005). Indeed, the agreement
between groups was especially high for the faux pas items,
with the item-by-item correlations above .94 and the
strength of the correlations was not significantly different
(z = 1.34, p = .180). For the Comprehension items, the
agreement was generally lower between the TD group and
reference sample (r = .84) and between the ASD group
and reference sample (r = .93) but the strength of these
correlations was not significantly different (z = 1.07,
p = .285). Likewise for the non-faux pas items, the
agreement between the control group and reference sample
(r = .86) was similar to the agreement between the ASD
group and reference sample (r = .71; z = 1.07, p = .285).
Furthermore, when comparing the strength of the correla-
tions between the control group and reference sample, the
faux pas and non-faux pas correlations did not differ
(z = 1.21, p = .226). However, when comparing the
strength of the correlations between the ASD group and
reference sample, the faux pas correlation was significantly
stronger than the non-faux pas correlation (z = 3.62,
p\ .001). In other words, for the ASD group only, the
degree of agreement with the reference sample about item
difficulty was significantly lower for the non-faux pas items
than the faux pas items. For most of the test items, we
could predict very well how well the ASD group would
perform on each item by knowing how many of the ref-
erence sample had got them correct. But this was not the
case for the non-faux pas items.
Discussion
This study investigated the understanding of vicarious
embarrassment by using a novel task, the cartoon faux pas
test. High-functioning adults with clinical diagnoses on the
autism spectrum were compared to typically-developed
adults carefully matched on age, gender, and IQ. The key
findings were the following. First, the ASD participants’
performance in answering the comprehension items (that
were presented in the same cartoon format as the other
items) was no different from the controls either in terms of
accuracy or RT. Second, if one considers the faux pas and
non-faux pas items separately the ASD participants were
not significantly poorer than the IQ- and age-matched
controls at detecting a faux pas when one was present (a
‘‘faux pas item’’), although their mean performance was
slightly below that of the controls. But when the cartoon
depicted a scenario where a faux pas had not been com-
mitted, the ASD participants responded significantly more
often that a faux pas had been. Third, for both groups of
participants, RTs were correlated across the three different
conditions (comprehension, faux pas and no-faux pas).
Fourth, RTs for both groups were faster for the non faux-
pas items than the faux pas items. Fifth, the ASD partici-
pants took significantly longer to give their responses in
both faux pas and non-faux pas conditions, but there was
no group by condition interaction. Sixth, signal detection
analysis demonstrated that the ASD participants have both
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significantly greater difficulty knowing if a cartoon depicts
a faux pas, and are also more likely to display a liberal
confirmatory bias (i.e. say ‘‘yes’’ regardless of how good
they are at detecting a faux pas if it is there). Finally, we
found that while the ASD group were in good agreement
with the reference control group about which comprehen-
sion and faux pas items were most difficult, they were in
significantly less agreement for the non faux-pas items.
Fig. 4 Item-by-item group
accuracy for each of the three
experimental conditions. The
IQ- and age-matched typically-
developed (TD) and autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) groups
are separately plotted against
the performance of the reference
control group. The axes show
the proportion of people in each
group who got a particular test
item correct. Each point
represents a particular test item.
So, for instance, the
figures show that when
considering the performances of
the faux-pas items for the ASD
participants versus the reference
controls, there were two test
items where almost all
participants in both groups got
them correct, and three test
items for which\ 60 % of both
groups got them correct
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The tendency towards false positives in the non-faux pas
condition found here replicates previous studies showing
over-detection of embarrassment in ASD (Zalla et al. 2009;
Hillier and Allinson 2002b), and shows that this effect is
not an artefact of the particular type of material or method
used to assess faux pas detection, since the material pre-
sented here was in a different format and most of the
scenarios were different from previous versions. However,
this pattern of results provides constraint upon theorising
about the cause of this apparent ‘‘over-detection’’ of faux
pas in ASD participants. Since the TD participants were
carefully matched for age and IQ, and the ASD participants
performed as well as they did on questions testing com-
prehension of events depicted in the cartoons, we can
dismiss any explanation that the faux pas test differences
here were an artefact of differences in general cognitive
ability, or ability to attend to, or perceive, the test
materials.
Instead, we consider here how well the data fits four
potential explanations for these results. Hypothesis 1 was
that ASD participants may show excessive attributions of
mental states. This explanation would be supported by a
pattern of results where ASD participants show good per-
formance on faux pas items, but poor performance on non-
faux pas items, with good agreement in terms of items
difficulties with TD controls. This pattern was not observed
here. While the ASD participants did perform similarly to
the matched controls on the faux pas items and worse on
the non-faux pas items, the items difficulty analysis showed
poor agreement with the reference controls for the non-
faux pas items.
Hypothesis 2 proposed an over-sensitivity to embarrass-
ment, due either to compensation for poor mentalizing
(Hypothesis 2a) or as a learned or compensatory strategy
without the context of poor mentalizing (Hypothesis 2b).
These accounts would be most consistent with a pattern of a
liberal criterion for responding ‘‘yes’’ as assessed by the
signal detection analysis, with relatively fast RTs to faux pas
items, and either poor faux pas detection in the case of
Hypothesis 2a or good faux pas detection in the case of
Hypothesis 2b. The ASD participants did indeed show a
liberal criterion for responding yes, as shown by the signal
detection analysis. However, the SDT analysis also showed
poor sensitivity to faux pas, which excludes Hypothesis 2b.
In terms of RT, the ASD participants were slower with both
faux pas and non-faux pas items than the TD controls.
However, although there was no significant group by con-
dition interaction, it was the case that the mean difference in
overall speeds between faux pas and non-faux pas items was
slightly smaller for theASDparticipants (Table 2). So,while
this result does not strongly support Hypothesis 2a, it is not
inconsistent with it. In general, therefore, Hypothesis 2a is a
reasonable fit to the results here.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that knowing that a faux pas has
not been committed requires more subtle or detailed social
judgement than detecting a faux pas when it is present.
This account would be supported by good agreement
between the ASD group and reference controls in terms of
relative item difficulties for both faux pas and non-faux pas
items, and slower RTs to non-faux pas items. This
hypothesis is not supported by the results here. There was
significantly less agreement between the ASD and refer-
ence controls as to the difficulty of the non-faux pas items
than was found between the matched controls and the
reference controls; this was not the case for the faux pas
items. A typical explanation in psychometrics for such a
circumstance would be that the non faux pas items are not
measuring the same thing to the same degree in the two
groups, and across the two sets of items. Moreover, RTs to
non-faux pas items were actually faster than to the faux pas
items. Thus Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Hypothesis 4 was that deciding that something is not
present is a more ‘‘open-ended’’ decision-making task than
detecting something that is present, and that ASD partici-
pants may have a particular problem with open-ended
tasks. This predicted slower RTs to the non-faux pas items
and lack of agreement between the ASD participants and
controls as to item difficulty for the non faux pas items.
The latter finding was found here, but not the former: the
ASD groups’ RTs to non-faux pas items were significantly
faster than to the faux pas items. Thus this hypothesis
receives only partial support.
In summary, this study has demonstrated that the phe-
nomenon of apparent ‘‘over-detection’’ of embarrassment
in faux pas tests by adults with diagnoses of autism spec-
trum conditions is found even when the materials being
used differ greatly from the original versions of the test in
terms of how they are presented, and even where the
content of individual situations depicted is different. This
phenomenon can be seen independently of issues to do
with age, gender, or IQ. The hypothesis that best fits the
patterns of data in this study is that the ASD participants
have both a problem with detecting faux pas, and also that
they adopt a liberal criterion for detection. In other words,
in this study they appeared to default to saying ‘‘yes’’ when
non-faux pas items were presented. It is noteworthy in this
respect that the ASD participants did not say ‘‘yes’’ sig-
nificantly more frequently than matched controls to the
faux pas items. This suggests that it is a less likely
explanation that they are showing a confirmation bias to the
question presented in this format of test (‘‘embarrassing?’’)
than it is that they are adopting a more liberal criterion for
answering ‘‘yes’’. The reason for the ASD adoption of a
liberal threshold is beyond the scope of this paper. How-
ever one possibility may be that it is an adaptation to their
relative inability to detect embarrassment or in response to
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having learned, or being told, that their differences in faux
pas appreciation are likely to lead to false negatives. Thus
this study may add to the debate concerning ‘‘compen-
satory’’ behaviours when considering psychometric test
results in autism (see e.g. Brunsdon and Happe´ 2014;
Johnson 2012).
Having a better understanding of the one’s own social
difficulties may lead to a greater awareness of potentially
embarrassing situations and, while this may lead to over-
compensation, this may help individuals with autism to
avoid making faux pas.
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